

16 November 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Bross

SUBJECT: Requirements

A Requirement is Now a Many Splintered Thing

1. The very word "requirement" has become so splintered in the variety of its interpretation and usage by the increasing number of people who now concern themselves with the affairs of the Intelligence Community, as to become like a broken mirror with the holder of each piece believing he has the whole of it, albeit in truth he is seeing but the reflection of his own parochial interests. This splintering is compounded by the use of at least nine other words, either as a synonym for "requirement" or in some way to qualify it: objective, need, demand, problems, attention, coverage, situations, questions, and interests. In practically all cases, however, the basic application of the word or words relates to the "reason for" the collection of information and/or the production of intelligence.

Clear Definition Needed

2. To get at our problem, to determine what kind of a problem it is, or perhaps even to see whether in fact we have a problem at all, requires at the outset an agreed definition of the word "requirement" and the same for all other words used in lieu of or in conjunction with it.

Webster defines "requirements" as "something required"; something obligatory or demanded, as a condition; something needed; a necessity; need." It should be noted, I think, that none of these definitions give any consideration to an ability to satisfy the "requirement" nor do they make it a pre-requisite. The best current example of this is our "requirement" to get to the moon even though we certainly do not have any proven capability to get there at this point in time.

The Community's View of Requirements

3. To get at just what an "intelligence requirement" really is, I suggest that we review the Community's constitution and by-laws to see what light they can shed on this matter.

a. The basic law supporting the Community (Sec. 102 of the National Security Act of 1947 as amended) establishes certain principles:

(1) Every duty assigned to the CIA under this law is for the purpose of coordinating the intelligence activities of the Government in the interest of national security.

(2) The advice and recommendations it is the duty of the CIA to make to the NSC, are those concerning such intelligence activities of the Government departments and agencies as relate to the national security.

(3) The intelligence, which it is the duty of CIA to correlate and evaluate, is that which relates to the national security.

(4) It is provided that the departments and other agencies of the Government shall continue to collect, evaluate, correlate, and disseminate departmental intelligence.

National vs Departmental - Largely a Distinction Without a Difference

4. There appear to be two main qualifications in the law cited above. first, it is the extent to which a piece of intelligence or an intelligence activity relates to the "national" security that determines whether or not it shall be subject to coordination under the law; second, it implies, I think, that nothing done under this law should impinge upon the right of the departments and agencies of the Government to do what is necessary to obtain their own "departmental" intelligence. The law does not define the term* "departmental" nor does it establish any criteria for determining when intelligence or intelligence activities should be considered to "relate to the national security." It would seem logical to think, however, that the proviso guarding departmental intelligence interests is not so blank a check as to cover activities which would adversely affect the national security or any intelligence activities related thereto. With respect to resources devoted to intelligence activities, this law could hardly condone a higher priority for the allocation of resources to meet "departmental" requirements than to those determined

*The NSC definition of "departmental" in NSCID #1 is - "that intelligence which any department or agency requires to execute its own mission."

to be "related to the national security." The key and unresolved question is - who determines what intelligence or intelligence activities activities relate to the national security?

Basic Community Concepts

5. The basic Community directive (NSCID No. 1) starts off with these basic concepts:

- a. The US intelligence effort is a national responsibility
- b. It must be organized and managed
- c. The purpose of this organization and management is to:
 - (1) exploit to the maximum the available resources of the

Government.

- (2) satisfy the intelligence requirements of the NSC and of the departments and agencies of the Government.

NSCID #1 on National vs Departmental - Preserves the Distinction but Eliminates the Difference

6. NSCID No. 1 starts right out by meeting the problem of "national" versus "departmental" head-on and solves it by establishing the principle that the U. S. intelligence effort as a whole is a national responsibility and that the purpose of its organization and management is to exploit resources to meet both the intelligence requirements of the NSC (National) and those of the departments and agencies (departmental).

NSCID No. 1 on Resources - Do the Best You Can With What You Get

7. The NSC deals with intelligence resources in the basic concepts referred to in paragraph 6 above and establishes the exploitation of resources as one of the purposes for which the intelligence effort of the U.S. is to be organized and managed, the other purpose is the reason for the exploitation of resources - to satisfy intelligence requirements. Except for one thing these NSC established principles would give the Community a clear right to enjoy the maximum use of all Government resources in the satisfaction of intelligence requirements whether national or departmental; the joker is the inclusion of the qualifying word "available," i. e., "exploit to the maximum the AVAILABLE resources of the Government." The problem arises because the NSC did not accompany its qualification with any expression as to who determines the type and extent of resources that will be made available for maximum exploitation. Perhaps the answer lies in determining which of two divergent interpretations of these words referring to resources was intended by the NSC, i. e.,

a. "exploit to the maximum (all) the available resources of the Government,"

or

b. "exploit to the maximum (those) resources of the Government (made available) to satisfy intelligence requirements, etc."

Community View

8. The NSC endorsed another provision in NSCID # 1 (para. 6., a. (1)) which tends to support the broad rather than the restrictive interpretation of the words relating to the availability of resources, although this provision does not specifically refer to the term "resources" as such—it reads:

"—the DCI in consultation with and supported by the other members of the USIB and by other appropriate offices, shall: (1) Call upon the other departments and agencies as appropriate to ensure that on intelligence matters affecting the national security the intelligence community is supported by a full knowledge and technical talent available in or to the Government." Admittedly this language appears to relate to people who have knowledge or technical talent rather than to things like hardware, equipment, material, etc. However, the intent appears to be to establish the principle that in the satisfaction of intelligence requirements, all resources that can be used will be used.

Management View

9. The other side of this resource coin is the view, largely held I think by those who are outside the Community and directly in charge of resources, to the effect that they should determine what and how much resources will be made available for intelligence purposes, whether it be the number of attaches in Peru or the number of buckets allocated by NRO. Under this concept the interpretation of the NSC statement on

SECRET

Approved For Release 2004/05/12 : CIA-RDP86M00612R000100020017-4

resources would be read something like this: the intelligence community will be organized and managed to exploit to the maximum the products resulting from whatever resources are made available to it in order to satisfy intelligence requirements, etc.

NSC Assignment of Management Related Duties to USIB

10. The NSC has assigned certain duties to the USIB that have a direct bearing on the resource problem:

a. To begin with, the NSC established the USIB for three reasons:

(1) to maintain the relationship necessary for a fully coordinated intelligence community;

(2) to provide for a more effective integration of and guidance to the national intelligence effort.

b. Second, the NSC assigned certain responsibilities to USIB that would appear to have a direct bearing upon intelligence resources, in fact, the products resulting from the carrying out of these responsibilities would appear to be the main basis for the development, allocation and employment of intelligence resources—these responsibilities are:

(1) to establish policies and develop programs for the guidance of all departments and agencies concerned;

(2) to establish appropriate intelligence objectives, requirements and priorities.

SECRET

The NSC on Requirements

11. The NSC in NSCID No. 1 also dealt with the problem of requirements, albeit they used the term "objectives" in lieu thereof, by fixing responsibility for the development of these objectives and for their issuance in a form that would have directive force within the Community. (Paragraphs 3., a. and b. (1) are pertinent)

a. General guidance and the establishment of specific priorities for the production of national and other intelligence and for collection and other activities in support thereof, shall be done by the DCI with the concurrence of the USIB.

b. This guidance shall include both comprehensive objectives generally applicable to (all) foreign countries and areas, and priority objectives with reference to specific countries and subjects.

c. The DCI shall act for the NSC to issue this guidance in the form of DCID's that shall, as applicable, be promulgated and implemented within the normal command channels of the departments and agencies concerned.

d. DCID 1/2 establishes comprehensive national intelligence objectives that are generally applicable to all foreign countries and areas.

e. DCID 1/3 which establishes the Priority National Intelligence Objectives and each of its quarterly supplements, carry the specific qualification that these listings of priority objectives, presupposes that

~~SECRET~~

the bulk of the intelligence required for the formulation and execution of national security policy will be the product of normal intelligence collection and research under DCID 1/2; this directive, in indicating that the term "priority" means preferment in the allocation of research and collection resources, makes it clear that such preferment does not warrant neglect of the general and basic intelligence coverage required by DCID 1/2.

NOTE:

NSCID No. 1 was revised as of 4 March 1964 and therefore its provisions have in theory at least, been revalidated by the present department heads concerned, including Secretary's McNamara and Rust, and by the President.

By NSC Directive Intelligence Requirements Are What the
DCI and USIB Say They Are

12. It seems perfectly clear, to me at least, that "intelligence requirements" include the production of that finished intelligence, and the collection of information and other activities in support thereof, that the DCI and the USIB determine are necessary to satisfy the requirements for such intelligence of both the NSC (national) and the departments and agencies of the Government (departmental). These requirements are to be comprehensive in terms of both type of intelligence required (encyclopedic) and geographic coverage (global). It is also made clear that the establishment of priorities to indicate a preferred status in the

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

allocation of resources, shall not be applied in a manner to neglect general and basic intelligence coverage. Finally, these requirements or objectives established by the DCI and the USIB are to be accompanied by policies and programs which they shall establish for the guidance of all departments and agencies, and the whole package shall be issued in the form of DCID's which are to be promulgated and implemented within the normal command channels of the departments and agencies concerned. What more could one ask for to ensure that the resources will be made available to satisfy the intelligence requirements so established?

The Unanswered Question Remains - Who Decides What and How

Much Resources Will Be Made Available to the Community?

13. In simplest terms there are two answers being given to this question at the moment, they are divergent and the difference between them is due fundamentally to the differing perspectives of those proposing each of the answers.

a. On the one hand we have the perspective of those who are responsible for seeing to it that this country has all the intelligence it needs—they would say that good intelligence of all types is the very life blood of our national security and therefore whatever portion of our national resources are necessary to ensure that such intelligence will be obtained must be made available in order to ensure the security of the sum total of these resources.

SECRET

SECRET

Approved For Release 2004/05/12 : CIA-RDP86M00612R000100020017-4

b. On the other hand, those who are responsible for the management of the sum total of resources available to the Government, would take the view that intelligence, important as it may be, is only one of many requirements, needs, objectives, etc., that have a call upon these resources and therefore intelligence must compete for its share of the goodies in the public trough. These managers see themselves faced with not a question of guns or butter, but one of guns or spies, four buckets or only two, etc. Most importantly they feel that they who have the responsibility for all resources should make these decisions, not the Community, and further, that such decisions include determining the type and quantity of resources necessary to meet intelligence requirements. In other words, they are saying, "It is all right for you the USIB to tell us WHAT you want but don't try to tell us HOW to get it".

Can the Community Support It's Stand on Resources ?

14. In my view the Community at this point in time is facing this resources battle unarmed and half blind, because:

a. It does not have a clear picture of the totality of it's resources available and in being right now in terms of quantity, quality, target deployment, etc.,

b. Therefore, it is not in a position to say where it wants to go and what it needs to get there, because it simply does not know in totality where it is and what it has right now.

c. It continues to compound this untenable situation by developing


Approved For Release 2004/05/12 : CIA-RDP86M00612R000100020017-4

SECRET

the four programs that account for the major portion of the resources requested (the CIP, CCP, NRO program and CIA Budget), in virtually complete isolation from each other from start to finish, with no provision for anyone to review the combined sum total of these programs prior to their approval, or even after approval for that matter. The NIPE Staff is moving in this direction at the present time, but this effort is currently hampered, as has been said many times before, by the almost complete lack of commensurability between the data contained in these programs.

Parochialism Will Out

15. If any reader has had the stamina to plow through the excessive verbage in this paper he will no doubt suspect that it is but one more playing of the writer's favorite record—he will be dead right but I challenge him to show how this Community can fight effectively its battle for resources until it is in a position to prove that it knows at least as much about the order of battle of its own intelligence effort as it now does that of almost any other country in the world.



A/D/DCI/NIPE

25X1

Distribution:

Orig. - Mr. Bross
1 - Mr. Parrott

1 -
1 -
1 -



1 - Chrono file

25X1

~~SECRET~~